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Abstract 
This paper considers a group of self-interested agents (drivers) trying to optimize their utility by choosing the route with the 
least travel time and proposes an algorithm that converges to a pure Nash equilibrium almost surely in traffic games. Weakly 
acyclic games, which generalize potential and dominance solvable games, are closely related to multi-agent systems through 
the existence of a global objective function and its alignment to the local utilities of each agent.  
We show that in a multi-agent distributed traffic routing problem with both linear and non-linear link cost functions, in the 
form of a congestion game, the achievement of pure Nash equilibrium is possible even if the agents use only the utility 
information of the previous action. We propose a fast and adaptive algorithm for the informed-user problem that provides 
almost sure convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium in any weakly acyclic game. 
 
© 2012 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing 
Committee. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to study the route-choice behaviors of users in a traffic network comprised of a 
number of discrete, interactive decision-makers, which in turn implies that the traffic game considered here is an 
N-person non-cooperative game. We restrict our attention to a congestion game in this paper in which each user 
is assumed to know one's own payoff function. Furthermore, in our learning scheme we assume that each user 
implements his updating rule after receiving a signal or some data about the other users. We call such a traffic 
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game as the informed-user problem. We can consider a more realistic and plausible congestion game where each 
user doesn't know even his payoff (or cost) function and the other agents' information (payoffs, actions, 
strategies). The only information that each agent uses are the realized payoffs that are obtained by his day-to-day 
travel experiences. This setting of the traffic game is referred to as the naive user problem. These two classes of 
users in traffic games were firstly introduced by Selten et al. [12] in their behavioral experiments on travelers’ 
route-choice in traffic networks. 
In this paper we propose an efficient learning algorithm for the informed-user problem that converges almost 
surely to a pure Nash equilibrium. Recently, Marden et al. [9] proposed a Joint Strategic Fictitious Play (JSFP) 
with inertia for the informed-user problem. Our algorithm includes their method as a special case. As for the 
naive user algorithms, Leslie and Collins [8], Cominetti et al. [3] and Marden et al. [9] propose the payoff-
based algorithms.  Although the informed user algorithm presented in this paper can be easily extended so as to 
include the naive user problem, that is not the immediate target of this paper. 
Our algorithm for the informed-user problem is based on the weakly acyclic property of congestion games, 
and each user is assumed to take a different strategy at each time step according to whether he has selected his 
best action or not. If he fails to select his best action (that he would know in hindsight), he would take a strategy 
that assigns a relatively high probability according to a conditional logit model to the (tentative) best action. If he 
succeeds, he would take a strategy that keeps the current action. A tentative best action is identified by 
exploration. In addition, we show an alternative algorithm that needs no requirement of a weakly acyclic 
assumption, in which payoffs of actions that a user has not really selected (alternative actions with respect to the 
selected action) are recursively estimated by stochastic approximation equations. We will show that our 
algorithm achieves a pure Nash equilibrium with probability one.  
In the informed-user algorithm we use a logit model derived from stochastic fictitious play. A sensitivity 
parameter included in the logit model is recursively updated based on the regret defined by realized payoffs [6]. 
Therefore, if each user successfully selects a better action, the regret asymptotically converges to a very small or 
negative value, and the identifying ability of each user to select a best action is improved. 
Since our approach treats each agent as an individual decision-maker, different from the traditional traffic 
models, the approach is able to give an insight to the theoretical background into the recently developed 
transportation planning packages like MATSim (Multi-Agent Transport Simulation) and TRANSIMS 
(TRansportation ANalysis and SIMulation System). 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the notation and definition related to traffic games. 
Section 3 is the main part of this paper; therein, we discuss the informed-user algorithm and show its 
convergence property. In order to verify the proposed algorithm, simulation results using a test network with a 
single origin-destination connected by 3 routes are shown in section 4. We simulated the case of both using linear 
and non-linear link cost functions, respectively. In the last section, we provide our concluding remarks. 
2. Notation and definition 
The sets {1, , , , }I i N  and {1, , , , },
i iA k M i I   , represent the set of players and the set of 
actions of player i, respectively. We interchangeably use i ia A and ik A to describe a generic element of the 
action set. We use the conventional notation i ia A   to represent the action taken by the opponent(s) of player 
i, ia , and the action set of the opponent(s),
iA . The action profile is a vector denoted 
by 1( , , , , )i Na a a A a , or ( , )i ia a A a  where 1 NA A A u u . The payoffs (or utilities) of player i 
in a one-shot game are determined by the function :iu A o . At the end of each stage, player i observes a 
sample     which is the realized payoff that player i received at stage t. A mixed strategy π
i of player i is a 
probability distribution over his actions (or pure strategies), that is, ( )
i iAS '  where ( )iA'  is the (| | 1)
iA   
dimensional unit simplex.                                 
i
tU
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Definition 1 (Informed-user with announced payoffs). Each user does not know his/her payoff function and 
those of the other users as well. However, a central authority observes the realized payoffs      at each time period 
and announces it to all users in hindsight. Based on this information, user i can estimate the values        
n          for actions, ia , at time t. 
An informed-user i estimates           in the following way. A realized payoff of player i at time t is expressed as        
…...                   . The
 
empirical frequency of the action selected by user i is given by 
 
                           (2.1) 
where { }1 is the indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the statement in the parenthesis is true, and zero, 
otherwise. Then, an average of the realized payoffs at time t is defined as 
 
             (2.2) 
The action value that player i would have achieved if he had chosen the action ia is defined by 
 
                (2.3)         
Definition 2 (Informed user with anticipated payoffs).  Each user knows his/her payoff function but doesn’t 
know the payoff functions of the other users. Each user can estimate the expected payoffs that he/she would have 
received by taking other actions,                , through exploration provided that the other users' strategies remain 
unchanged. Furthermore, if each user believes that the other users’ action selection is based on empirical 
frequencies, the anticipated payoff of action      is given by (2.3). 
Definition 3 (Naive user). Each user doesn’t know his/her payoff function and those of the other users as well. 
In addition, each user does not know the number of participants in the game. The only information available to 
him/her is the realized payoff that he/she has received on that day,            . 
The concept of the informed-user with announced payoffs may be useful when simulating to build a traveler 
guidance system where a central authority observes the traffic conditions and informs them to every user. The 
idea of the informed-user with anticipated payoffs reflects the assumptions that are usually used in the traditional 
traffic assignment procedures where a planner knows the cost functions and the number of users and has the 
ability of searching for the minimum paths for each group of users. A learning scheme of the informed-user is the 
implementation of an updating rule based on partial monitoring after receiving a signal or some data about the 
other users. On the other hand, the naive user problem describes a more realistic and plausible situation where 
each user encounters an uncertain and non-stationary environment. 
Nash equilibrium that is achieved in games with complete information is one of the central solution concepts 
of game theory. Therefore, one of the objectives of the learning model is to study what kind of behavioral rule 
leads to this equilibrium as a consequence of a long-run non-equilibrium process of learning. For this purpose, we 
introduce some related definition to the informed-user algorithms shown in the next section.   
Definition 4 (Pure Nash equilibrium). A pure Nash equilibrium of a game is defined as an action profile that 
satisfies the condition: 
                            (2.4) 
Definition 5 (Potential games). A finite N-player game with action sets         and payoff functions         is a 
potential game if, for some potential function  
                (2.5) 
for every player, for every                 and for every                    It is an ordinal potential game if, for some 
potential function  
1
0
1
( ) { }
t
i i i i
t s
s
z a a a
t

 
  ¦1
1
0
1
: ( , ) : ( )
t
i i i i i
t s s t
s
U u a a u z
t


 
  ¦
1
0
1
( ) : ( , ) : ( , )
t
i i i i i i i i
t s t
s
V a u a a u a z
t

 
 
  ¦
( )i itV a
( )i itV a
( , )i i i it t tU u a a
 
1( , )
i i i
ta a

u
ia
( )i itU a
* *( ) max ( , )i i
i i i i
a A
u u a 

 a a
1{ }
n
i iA  1{ }
n
i iu  
1: ... ,nA AI u u o
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ),I I     i i i i i i i i i ik l k lu a a u a a a a a a
i j
j ia A

zu , .i i ik la a A1: ... ,nA AI u u o
tU
441 Toshihiko Miyagi et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  54 ( 2012 )  438 – 449 
                            
(2.6) 
for every player, for every                     and for every  
Definition 6 (Weakly acyclic games). A game G is weakly acyclic if, from every strategy profile a there is a 
better response improvement path              such that             and      is a pure Nash equilibrium of G. 
Weakly acyclic games are known to have sinks that are singletons under better-response dynamics [5, 10]. The 
weakly acyclic game is repeated for                       times where at every stage t, player i chooses an action                      
. This action selection is a function of the information available to each player up to stage t and both the 
action selection function and the available information depend on the underlying learning process. 
3. Informed-user algorithm for congestion games 
3.1. Flow and cost  
We begin with the flow conservation equations in traffic games with atomic flow. For simplicity purposes, we 
restrict our attention to a single origin-destination (O-D) pair connected by paths (routes). The action set        
www w      corresponds to the set of paths. Path flows are denoted by an M-dimensional        
vector   wwwwwwww        . A set of paths available to player i is denoted by            .  Let L be a set of        
links,       be the flow on link         and let         be an element in the link-path incidence matrix. To avoid 
confusion, we use      and                        interchangeably. The same rule is applied to the payoffs and the empirical distribution as well. The number of visits to path k by player i at time t is a 0-1 variable and is defined 
by 
                                           (3.1) 
Then, the aggregated path flow and link flows at t are defined as follows: 
 
 
                                             (3.2) 
 
 
 
We also use the following notation on flow: 
 
 
 
 
Link travel cost on       at time t is given by a real-valued, (not necessarily continuous differentiable), non-
decreasing function,            . Travel cost of path            is defined as:  
                                        (3.3) 
where      denotes the value of time for user i. We define the payoff of path k as    WW             .  Thus, the payoff 
function is no longer continuous with respect to the flow.  
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3.2. Potential function in congestion games 
A congestion game is a class of potential game [11], a kind of weakly acyclic game, and has the property that 
for any action         , there exists a better reply path starting from a and ending at some pure Nash equilibrium of 
the game [9,14]. In congestion games, homogeneous players with the same payoff function are usually assumed.  
Now, we define the congestion game with payoffs                                     
             (3.4) 
where               is the number of users defined by (3.1) and (3.2) under action           , and                  represent the 
cost of action (route-choice)       when other players take the action profile     . For now, we let                         . 
We assume that the link cost function is increasing with respect to the link flow. We define the potential function 
as shown in (3.5) to show that every finite congestion game has a pure strategy equilibrium: 
                                                         (3.5)        
This can be written as: 
 
 
                                  
(3.6) 
 
 
where 
Then, the potential difference for actions     and     is given as: 
                                            
(3.7) 
On the other hand, from (3.5) we can write, 
                                   (3.8) 
Thus, a deterministic congestion game is an exact potential game that has a finite improvement property in which 
every player's payoff function is aligned with the potential function. The action             is the better response of player i when it holds that 
 
That is, if there exist no better response for     , the action     must be a pure Nash equilibrium.  
We call the operation defined by (3.8) as exploration. The exploration implies that player i knows his cost 
function        and can search the action values of his alternative actions provided that the actions of the other players           remain unchanged.  
3.3. Stochastic congestion games 
We consider a general class of traffic games where each player takes a better response strategy rather than a 
best response. Better response may be rational in cases where each of the user’s behavior is perturbed due to 
private information and/or when the link cost is dependent on the flows of the other links. Furthermore, we 
assume that the game has a weakly acyclic property where only a single user is allowed to search his minimum-
cost path at every stage provided that the other users keep their previous behaviors.  
Before discussing our model, following Young [13, 14] and Marden et al. [9], we introduce a graph structured 
by the history of action profiles up to time t, wwwwwww     We assume that the histories are anonymous: it does 
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not matter who played a given action in a given period. We consider the action space A so that all the histories are 
contained in it.     
Construct a complete directed graph with |A| nodes, one for each action profile (state). The node corresponding 
to state a  will be calledm. A tree, T, rooted at node n, n-tree, is a set of (|A|-1) directed links such that, for every 
node different from n, there is a unique path in the tree to n. A better response path is a sequence of action 
profiles                         such that, for every                    , there is exactly one player i such that  
 
 
Starting from an arbitrary action profile          , construct a better response sequence                   until it can no 
longer be extended. Since the potential function is strictly decreasing along the path and the action space is finite, 
the final element of the path must be a Nash equilibrium point.  
In deterministic congestion games, a user always takes a best response. However, a user would make a 
probabilistic choice in the case when the payoff function has noise: 
 
Following Fudenberg and Levine [4], we assume that player i chooses strategy      to maximize  
 
where          is a smoothing parameter and                           is a private information of player i, which is a smooth, 
strictly differentiable concave function. A typical example of the private information function is the entropy 
function 
 
With this specification, we define the smooth best response function  
 
This maximization problem leads to the following logit type from the best response function: 
                              
 
                           (3.9) 
 3.4. Informed-user algorithms (algorithm A) 
At the initial stage t=0, each user randomly selects the initial action    . User i lets this action be his tentative 
best action (TBA) at        WWWWWW. At each subsequent time step, a randomly selected user, say user i, chooses his tentative best action      by exploration, and includes it in his set of best actions 
                                                   
(3.10) 
where 
                                                       
(3.11) 
User i chooses his tentative best action (TBA)    with probability          and the other actions              with 
probability,       i.e. 
 
 
 
1, , , na a a 1 1nd d 
1 11) ) ( ) ( ) ) ,  
i i i ii ii a a iii u uii a a and 
 
z  a a
0a A 0 1, , na a a
( , ) ( )i i i i i it t t t tU u a a aH 
iS
( ) ( , ) ( )i i i i i iV uS S S P\ S 
0P ! : ( )i iA\ ' o
( ) ( ) log ( ).i ii i i i i ia A a a\ S S S ¦
1 1( ) arg max ( ) ( , ) ( ) .i ii i
i i i i i i i i i
t t ta A
a a u a a
S
E S P\ S 6 ª º¬ ¼¦
^ `
^ `1 1
exp ( , ) /
( )
exp ( , ) /
i i
i i i
ti i
t i i i
t
b A
u a a
a
u b a
PE P





 ¦
0
ia
*
1 01,
i it k a a  
*k
* *
1{ : arg max ( , )}i i
i i i i i
t t
a A
B k A k u a a
   
1 , 1( , ) ( 1).
i
i i i i i
t t
a
u a a C fZ  

  ¦
*k 1 itw *( )ita kz
* *( ) (1 )
( )
i i i
t t t
i i i i
t t t
a k with probability k w
a is chosen randomly over A with probability k w
S
S
  
 
i
tw
444   Toshihiko Miyagi et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  54 ( 2012 )  438 – 449 
The variable    will be referred to as the user’s inertia following Young [14]. Formally for              is determined by 
 
                         (3.12) 
                    
 
where 
                                       (3.13) 
 
K is a normalization factor and the logit-parameter      is updated by 
 
                         (3.14) 
 
                                      
 
 
where      denotes the player’s regret defined by                    . The new action profile a, is generated according to 
the probability distributions      . 
Algorithm A is a family of informed user algorithms that consist of Algorithm A-0, A-1 and A-2. Replace the 
first equation in (3.12) with 
                               
 
                       (3.12’) 
 
This implies that user i assign the probability          to the TBA, where                         . Equation (3.12) 
together with (3.13) represents the re-planning (or adaptive learning) process of user i. This depends if he has 
succeeded in choosing the best action or not. If the TBA is repeatedly selected, the user stays there in the 
subsequent time periods. If the randomly selected action is not consistent with the TBA, each user chooses the 
TBA cautiously according to conditional the logit model (3.13). Algorithm A-1 uses an adaptive learning rule 
(3.12). Algorithm A-0 is the case when, in place of (3.12), we let  
 
                                       (3.12b) 
  An alternative rule may be called a model free approach where, in place of (3.13),      is replaced by a binary 
function that takes 0 or 1, i.e., 
 
                                                    (3.13b) 
 
with the same adaptive learning as Algorithm A-1. The model free approach is called Algorithm A-2, and is a 
variant of the JSFP with inertia proposed by Marden et al. [10]. Algorithm A-2 is an adaptive learning with a 
person-independent and time invariant inertia         . In Algorithm A-0 and A-1, the user’s ability in selecting the 
TBA is also increasing as             because the regret defined by (3.14) approaches a small value [6].  
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3.5. Convergence property 
Before discussing the convergence property of our algorithm, we consider a Markov chain generated by an 
individual-by-individual updating action selection process. We label an action 0 when a user fails to select the 
TBA, and 1 when the user succeeds in selecting the TBA. The number of individuals who takes the action 1 is 
denoted by    at the end of period t. Let     denote the probability that an individual chooses action 1 out of the 
other (n-1) agents. We define the transition probability of going from s to s+1 as the probability that one of the n-
s users who chose action 0 is selected to update, and that user has a probability of    to select action 1. So the 
transition probability is        WW . This Markov chain introduced by Jackson [7] has a nice property; it is 
irreducible and aperiodic, hence, has a unique steady-state distribution over states,      i.e. 
 
                                 
                                   (3.15) 
 
which, together with   wwwwcompletely determines the solution. We apply this Markov chain to our 
convergence proof by showing                              , where       is the probability of the null user choosing action 0.  Proposition 1. Suppose that a traffic game has a unique Nash equilibrium. Then, in any weakly acyclic game 
for the informed user problem, the last element of action profiles, a, generated by a family of Informed-user 
algorithms, converges to a pure Nash equilibrium almost surely as  
Sketch of proof) First, note that there exist constants w and      such that for all time           and all player  
 
Therefore, the probability of selecting a tentative best action      is given as 
 
Let                . That is, only one player selects the random action not equal to the TBA. From (3.15), 
 
 Suppose that the stationary probability     is given by 1-w. Then we have                           where                     w        
is the probability that the last person i fails to select the best action after long time periods and takes a very small 
positive value. Since we can choose a small value for     such that             
 
, we can conclude that   WWW.        
If            , all probabilities included in the sequence                
 
will approach zero. On the other hand, if we 
assume                all probabilities take zero values. This contradicts the condition of                   . 
Corollary1. Suppose that every user estimates the action values with 
 
where             is a deterministic sequence satisfying  
 
Therefore, (3.10) is replaced by 
 
 
Then, a family of Algorithm A almost surely converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in a congestion game with 
simultaneous moves. 
In case of simultaneous moves, each user encounters perturbed payoffs. Payoff dynamics is expressed as the 
following stochastic approximation. 
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where            is a martingale difference and 
 
is an element of a vector                                                                                .              is Lipschitz continuous and
 payoffs usually remain as finite values. Therefore, if we let   
 www  
, it follows from the stochastic approximation 
theory [1, 2] that the estimated payoffs of user i,  , converges to the expectation of the realized payoffs        
sas                 .  
4. Simulations 
The proposed algorithm is applied to a single origin-destination (O-D) network using linear and non-linear 
cost functions on the links, respectively. The network has 5 links and 3 routes as shown in Fig. 4.1. This 
translates to 3 actions available for each player.  The flow conservation equation is described aswwwwwwwww        
where N is the number of trips and                     denotes  the  kth  path flow. We put 10 0.05N and H   in our 
simulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1. the traffic network 
4.1. Link cost functions 
The following linear link cost functions are assumed: 
                 and  
where      is the travel time of link    and     is the traffic flow on link    .  Under normal conditions, there exists a 
unique Wardrop equilibrium that is consistent with a pure Nash equilibrium in this network. For the non-linear 
link cost functions, we assume the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) type-cost (or link performance) function,  
                                                                     (4.1) 
where       is the free flow travel time,      is the capacity of link    and             is the average travel time for a 
vehicle on link 
4.2. Simulation of informed user problems 
Players (drivers) choose initial routes randomly, and every day thereafter, adjust their routes using the 
algorithm A-1. Each simulation ran for 30 iterations. Fig. 4.2. depicts the convergence of payoffs and shows that 
each driver receives the same payoff (or costs) .  Fig. 4.3. shows convergence property of Algorithm A-1 in a unit 
simplex on path flows. In the figure, an edge of a cell corresponds to a state in the potential field. The figure 
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shows a better response path starting from the big red dot, to a unique absorbing point (a pure NE), designated by 
the green dot. Since the initial starting point is randomly selected, the better response path takes a different 
trajectory at each simulation. 
                  
 
 
 Fig. 4.2. (a) experienced travel time with a linear cost function; (b) experienced travel time with a linear cost function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Fig. 4.3. a better response path from starting point (red dot) to the final point (green dot) 
4.3. Traffic game with many agents 
Suppose that each agent is consisted of a number of homogeneous drivers. When we want to simulate 1000 
drivers, it is equivalent to the case of a simulation with 10 agents where there are 100 drivers per agent. The BPR 
function (4.1) is a scale-invariant function so the travel cost on the link remains unchanged if the flow-capacity 
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ratio on each link keeps the same value. Therefore, simulating 1000 drivers’ behavior in a network with link-    
capacity          is equivalent to simulating 10 agents’ behavior within a network with a link-capacity                  . 
These two simulations result in the same flow pattern and the same travel costs. This scale-invariant property 
holds for the linear cost function as well. As the number of drivers in each unit becomes greater, the marginal 
effect of each driver to the other drivers gets smaller and smaller. Then, (3.8) is replaced by    
 
where             . This implies the exploration implementation of the minimum-path search used in traditional 
traffic assignment procedures. Therefore, a fast convergence property that the atomic model has still holds in 
congestion games with many agents. In order to determine the action space, the multi-path method like the K-
path search method and Dial’s algorithm is available. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We proposed efficient algorithms for the congestion game with informed-users and have shown that these 
algorithms converge to a pure Nash equilibrium almost surely. The validation of the proposed algorithm has been 
examined by numerical experiments and its effectiveness has been shown by its capability of treating traffic 
games with many agents. These algorithms are based on the fact that the congestion game is a kind of weakly 
acyclic game. We have also shown that in case of simultaneous moves, stochastic approximation of payoff-
estimates should be introduced. In this paper, we have focused on the informed-user algorithms with atomic users, 
however, algorithm A is applicable to non-atomic case and can be extended to the naive user algorithm with a 
slight modification. 
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